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I Introduction 
“Technologwal development enlarges the production scale" 1s an 
established theory of economics, and it has been田stainedby many 
scholars such as Marx and Galbraith (1967). 
About the role of technological innovation withrn the economic 
development processes, J. Schumpeter (1950) denoted曲目白eage of 
innovative, and pnvate entrepreneurship would be superseded by big 
bu sine田 throughdynamic evolution of economy with “the scrap and 
bu日d，” andthat systemal!zed research and development became the 
marn culture medium for technological innovation. 
As he put 1t, speakrng of the sources of economic progress in a capi-
ta!istic society“As soon as we go into the details and inquire into the 
individual items in which progress was most conspicuous, the trial leads 
not to the doors of those firms that work under conditions of compara-
lively free competition but precisely to the doors of the large concerns.” 
{Ibid., p. 82) And such・remarks became a ground of oligopoly bulwarks, 
Concernrng the relationship of industrial concentration and R & D activ1-
ties, the verification of the Schumpeter-Hypothes1s is made by many 
scholars such as J.S. Worley (1961), D. Hamberg (1964), F.M. Scherer 
(1965), E. Mansfield (1968), A.C. Cooper (1964), and K. Imai (1969), 
M. Uekusa (1973), A. Goto (1974), N. Doi (1977, 1978), E. Hatta 
(1978) et al. 
Most of these researchers either depend on algebraic methods a11Ding 
to fmd parameters of regression co-efficients between the firm s包eor 
industrial concentration and level-score of R & D (such as Expenditure 
for R & D, Number of Technologists, Capital value of R & D) or R & D 
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results (such as Number of Patents, etc) as mdependent variables; or 
they depend on statistical methods to find correlat10n co-efficients of 
each other as well. However, as Markham (1965) and Goto (1974) 
assert, the concept of Schumpeter is very inclusive; he defined the con-
cept of innovations broadly enough to include, among others, mergers, 
new organization, new advertising campaign, new product, the new 
process. Only the last two are logical consequences of technical research 
and development activ1l!es conducted inside a business firm. What 
Schumpeter really meant was that uncommitted balances were a pre-
requisite to engag担gin highly uncertain commercial activities. In the 
context of his basic thesis he left no room for doubt that he regarded a 
“large firm”as synonymous with a“large firm with market power” 
Therefore, whether the venficat10n methods of technological innova-
tion are suitable or not, they yield the irreparable gap between the total 
fi駅間 ofSchumpeter’s concept and its verifiers’results Hence, multi-
(!) 
dimensional verification is essenl!al. 
I M叫ti-dimensionalityof condition existing in the analysis of曲e
correlation between the innovative国pacity皿dfirm s阻e
Technological development 1s achieved through the proc田sof“tech-
nological innoval!on”which is introduced mto real production proce田es
by investment. For that purpose, new capital equipment 1s necessary to 
be embodied by invention. On the other hand, in the case of productiv-
ity improvement which is caused by administrative control on manage・
ment or product processes such as factory innovation, no new capital 
goods are nece田aryexcept for equipment. The improvement of labor 
productivity through process innovation is an important factor for 
strengthening也eproduction function. Thus, 1f we intend to verify the 
effectiveness of corporate actlvities by means of the former criteria, the 
hypothesis that small business may be more effective than big businesses 
because of the Penrose Constraint can be verified. 
On the other hand, we ought to pay attention to the case where the 
big business is much more efficient than small businesses, m accordance 
with labor-savmg effect (by the newly equipped automal!c factories）ー
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And if we choose the process担novat10neffect as也emam innovative 
白ctor,on account of sufficiency of R & D expenses and moreover high 
risk-adaptab出tyfor merchandising, we must make四rewhether or not 
the big busine咽 maybe better off than small busmesses 12' 
Secondly, owing to the difference in the industrial structures, merits 
or dements may occur between the process industry and knock-down 
industry. Especially担 regardto the productive innovation,. big busi-
回目esare obviously advantageous m the economies of scale th叩 smallor 
middle sized firms m respect of process industry. This is true even if 
neither of these structures shows the relational difference level of sig勾
nificance with each other in the case of big businesses. 
Thirdly, if we define the innovation level with the phase of ‘quality’ 
in view (let血elevel of quality be the function of umversality or gener-
ality，一 thisis the concept corresponding to the level of the ‘basic’ 
research of R & D), big businesses wtll be加 amore advantageous posi-
)3) 
tion m respect to the risk-allowance. 
Analytical results can difer, on the one hand, by the selection of 
dependent vanables such as managenal scale or busines・ concentration, 
etc ; namely, such factors as productive elements (the number of em-
ployees, plottage, floorage) or managerial indices (profit, value added 
rate, etc.), and so on (Robins叩 andClark l940;Crum 1939). 
Human factors, such as those of researchers or developers should 
never be ignored. R & D of semi-conductors which orig加atein transistors 
is now泊 fulmature period, but when m the expl01tation penod, a 
responSible mam researcher of M Electric Co. resigned, as a result of fric-
ti on加 thesystem, serious damage was done to research staff and much 
precious time was wasted before they recovered the usual attainment 
level, and we also know about the case of S Industry where the preSident 
did not understand the feelmgs of mventors and fatled to prevent the 
stagnation of the system. As is seen from these cases, human factors are 
to be counted among the long range questions of system control 
Research by Kenkyu-Kaihatsu Kiko"' (The Organization of Research 
& Development) which raised research level so highly as to produce the 
“System incentive analyses，”created a stir on an achievement concerning 
48 
R&D. 
With regard to newly applicable factors: 
(1) As for unquantifiable factors, apply strict psychological s四l田
φ1ulti-dimensmnal scales such as‘Method of succe回1vecategories’， 
etc.) and verify validity. 
{2) By adding the so called ‘Hypothetical Scale' test, evaluate techno-
logical ab山tyof the technologists担 thesame area of the rival 
firms, v1s-i-v1s. 
{3) Verify‘Reliability’through a second research. 
( 4)Carry out“Multi dimensional analyses，＇’ by taking business scale 
md1ces as dependent variables and integrate both quantifiable and 
unquantifiable data. 
(5) As is mentioned・ in the research comments, first analyze the side of 
日nancialconditions and the number of patent-acquisition, and then 
on the basis of these results, make research into the conscmusness of 
managers for R & D 
(6) Finally, remember that one of the important problems of R & Dis 
a cross connection of human incentive factors with business environ-
mental factors. 
According to the social research done by Institute of Economics of 
the Kik田 ShinkoKai {1981), the characteristics of “job at血nmentin回
centive”of firms with capital stock of over ten-billion yen is referred to 
as“Nat10nal project-oriented" feature But，国首leca田 offirms of 100 
million to 9 9 billion yen (capital stock), the incentive is onented to 
“Patent numbers.”In the case of businesses ofless than 100 million yen, 
“Favorable-dealings”by administrat10n are白em田nincentive to job 
attainment 
We expect the venf1cation of th出eresults to be made agam, because 
these factors are important and effective in connection with the intensity 
of influence over research-productivity of research professionals. 
II The cl祖国cterof informatrnn venture business and particularity of 
“'information”as the economic goods 
Because enough has been said for the moment concernmg the prob-
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!ems of白口百 S包evs. R & D, we will develop an analysis of the character 
of“Information-Industry，” especially of the scamty of information 
such as that of economic goods. Information industry has now been 
highhghted as one of the star industries with the knowhow-intensive 
tendency and high value added inclination of industry st四cture
It has commonly been held that information is capable of duplicat血g
and for that reason sources cannot be expunged; m addition, aside from 
costs of duplication and transfer, users can increase in number infinitely 
without much cost. Namely, in accordance with the quality of public 
goods, marginal social cost has been considered to come to zero. But 
when we define many information mdustries with this quality泊 view,
we cannot but recogmze the fact that they range from“nearly-public-
goods”producing industries to the industries which are defined by Y. 
Noguchi (1974），“：By suitable legal protection, their right of‘Exclusivity’ 
(from lmitatmg) must be held systematically, .” 
Now, we shall need to get hold of the character of information as 
‘Economic Goods.’As 1s shown m many cases where information is 
pnvately owned and also has m‘Exclusivity,' actually the Information 
does not necessarily become the pubhc goods. At the same time，“Ir-
reversibility”担 thedealmgs has never been paid attent10n to as to its 
character. Once leaked out, information instantly becomes worthless, 
回 dcan never be “compensated.”h addition, strong external effects 
often occur“The utility of certain mformation for some particular indi-
vidual is influenced not only by the amount of [mformat10n] holdmgs of 
his own, but by由atof o出ers.＇’（Noguchi;1974, p. 46). Usually，四rt副n
systematized information has, as a whole, the definite value, and 1f cut 
apart it results in a merely worthiess matter (Indivisib出tyof Informa-
tion). 
Especially in出ecase of“Software，＇’血ispossibility may be very 
high In addit10n to the above character, the “uncertainty”pertaining 
to the production回 dconsumption of “Informat10n goods，”cannot help 
accelerate the tendency to keep secret the contents of information The 
stronger the tendency of business to handle the “Intelligence”or know-
how strategically, the higher the po田ibilityto consume them only 
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within its own groups We must never disregard the function of informa-
lion as a trigger for strengthemng systemat包al!onof industries. 
In retrospect, if it were not for diffusion of computer, no progress of 
information industry could be made. Now, Jap阻四此ssecond to US in 
the computer holdings, and even during the post oil-deficit crisis, growth 
rate of gross sales had been higher th皿 20%per year 
In the mid 1970s, software industry which was capable of developing 
computer programs or software appeared on stage in Japan. Many of 
these managers were technologists who had formerly been computer 
makers and entrepreneurship was stil kept vividly alive. The origioators 
of new ideas on software development were usually the managers or 
members of the board of directors, so, they had high nsk-adaptabtl1ty 
to an unexpected situation On winning the victory over rival busine咽es
through produc加sand seling the “Intelligence”（Software), the venture 
enterprise must yield more than one high quality‘Software’which 1s 
superior to that of other busioe岨es
The share of sales concerning software development and programming 
withio the total sales, however, 1s les than nearly 40% and the venture 
enterprises can just tide over difficulty because of the share of above 
30% by chargiog for accountiog or by visiting job as software program-
151 mer 
Moreover, the greater part of the software which is developed by these 
software mdustries is of“Applicat10n softs，＇’and the venture enterprises 
have not yet been able to cope with m勾orhardware firms (Main-framers) 
in the area of“BaSic softs”Not to mention the shortage of funds, the 
ma恒 reasonlies (stil) in the lower estimation of software quality than 
that of America’s, and “Un-bundling”（the software whose price is 
separated is sold distinctly from hardware pnce; in America, IBM did 
away with ‘bundling’practices in 1970,) has not yet been prevalent in 
Japan, so software is st出 treatedas goods of‘free of charge.' From now 
on, m proportion to the diffusion of office computer and routinization 
of distributed-processing, the development of various“End-user oriented" 
application software can be prepared And the growth in the area of 
data-base will be expected through the diffusion of big capacitive com-
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puter and also extension of commumcation networks.附
N The scheme of market entry of venture business 
The market where venture business mtends to penetrate is supposed 
to be the kmd of market with imperfect competition where numerous 
firms sel (or serve) substitution goods “software，” and sys白matization
of firms gradually permeates throughout the market “Softwares，”which 
are evidently different goods from each other with different properties, 
P.C. 
Ps 
Pn 
P。
。
MRs 
A Cs 
MCs 
Dt 
Qz Q1 Quant. 
Figure I 
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may monopolize a port10n of the market, and substitution goods pos-
sibly appear a short t1me later. Then, these supp且ersare usually m a 
competitive position with each other. 
Let the short-range average cost curve of venture business be ACs, 
marg加alcost curve be MCs, and these cu刊esof big businesses be AC0 
and MC0 respectively. The primary fixed costs of newly entering firms 
(computer-rentals, loan mterests, etc) are obv10usly higher than those of 
the established industries 
Though the average price must be set at Ps, the price under the 
cutt泊goff price P 0 must be held until venture business achieves the 
market fame. 
Then, with al its excellent produc!Ive capacity greater由anQ,, 
venture business has to put up with increasing defi口tsP0,V,W,Ps (square 
measure), though it has been accumulating “High古叫eknowhow pro-
ductive abilities" within the enterprise. At this stage, entering venture 
business has to guard ag国nstany po田ibilityof being affiliated with big 
businesses 
By the way, simple geometry may be incapable of handling the con-
cept of an industry which produces a“multi dimensional differentiated 
product.” 
Simple algebra and calculus contam no such limitation. We start with 
the case where al product differences are composed of variety and “in 
telligence-grade" which sometimes determine the way of managerial 
strategy. 
For notation 
X = outputs consist of various software-services or by charging for 
accountmg, etc X = sum of ‘Xi’ 
s ＝‘creative efforts' (R & D expenditures) expended to differen-
tiate X, especially about software creation S = sum of‘sj' 
s > 0. 
u = min泊四munit cost of produc担Ex 
v = mm1mum unit cost at which S can be created in a high-grade 
software programmmg division 
Z = profit 
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C ';uX + v~ = total cost; the degree of product differentiation; 
t* ＝」ニ
uX 
R = (M X）・X= total revenue 
where M = A + BS-S2; A and B are constants 
Hence, 
R = AX + BSX -S2X X2 
We assume that both the curve of unit cost of usual software-services 
and the curve of unit cost of differentiating the product are U苧shaped
Total revenue R can be increased by us泊Er田ourc田（high-grade回ft-
ware producing ability) to differentiate the output of the basic product 
variety X or any part of it. But，血cea'R/as2く0,the creation of high-
grade product variety is subject to dnmmshmg returns The a田umption,
that the demand curve for the product can be shifted upward, albeit at 
a decreasmg rate as sales effort is increased or quality improved, has 
characterized almost al discussions of monopolistic competition. A 
linear demand curve of the basic product (usual software services) is 
employed for the sole purpose of simplifying the notation. 
By our assumptions, a' R/ax2くo,a'R/as2く0and there is a fixed 
cost, hence, stay-out pricmg is possible for big businesses Namely, there 
is a profit Z (Z > 0)for such firms that are low enough to discou四gethe
entry of newly entering firms 
Equilibrium in the industry is achieved when it min加包es
C=uX+vS. ーー . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (I)
subject to the constraint 
AX+ BSX S2X X2 -uX vS-Z = 0.・・・（2)
This operation is equivalent to maximizmg R, subject to the con-
straint that, 
R-C-Z=O 
By the method of undetermmed multipliers we ob ta担fromequations 
(!)and (2) 
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u ＋λ｛A + BS S2 -2X -u) = 0 
(3) 
v ＋ λ（BX -2SX -v) = 0 
Thus 
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dS dX If；衣＞0, dS must be positive, vice 
Thus 
dX _ 2uvS2 -2 (Bu+ 2v）喝＋v (2Au + uB2 + 2Bv) 
. (6) 
dS (uB -2uS + 2v)2 
Jn equation (6), the denominator is always positive. When the nurner-
ator m equation (6) 1S zero, dX/dS = 0. We回nset this numerator equal 
to zero, solve it as a quadratic泊 S,and discard the negative root of (7) 
B v 今 今ヲ。，I?s = （τ＋計±（ザー 4Au'+ B'u')'1' . . .(7) 
The expression加 theroot is not negative, because S isnot expressed 
by a complex number. While u > 0,v > 0 
（旦＋今豆 O例
2 u 
L叫 benegative, and if I B 1. ＞与theequa伽 isnegative. The pro伽
tion in the neゆborhoodof the maximum po泊tis determined by the 
dX/dS tendency. And as is stated in“The Theory of Imperfect Compell』
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ti on”by D. Dewey (1969），“I believe it not unreasonable to assume that 
血eprimary net impact of these efforts is on也elocation ra血er血血on
the shape of出eaverage revenue curve.＇’ 
It will be better to seek equilibrium values of X and S in terms of the 
coefficients in equation (2) by substituting出eright side of equation ( 4)
for X in equation (2）回dthen回Iv泊gfor S. Yet, unfortunately, this 
substitution yields an equation with a term that conta泊sss, and a 
quintic equat10n has no general algebraic solution. But of course, when 
numerical values a日 assignedto A, B, Z, u, and v担 equation(2), the 
equilibrium numerical values for X and S can be found by several meth-
ods. 
Informatrnn venture business 1s a sort of production goods industry 
ra也erthan consumption goods produc泊Bindustry, so that the expan-
sion of demands is not to be made by advertising or sales promotions but 
by !ugh quality“Intelligence”itself. Therefore, information venture 
business has to have the ability to cope with the needs of chents for re-
finement on its quality product. 
The Figure 2 shows a hypothesis of ‘location (impact of effort)' and 
inflexion司ualityof marginal revenue cu四eMRs of information ven臼re
bus凶器.Here, we are to suppose the prnne-to・m1d range developing 
period when the venture business may guard aga泊stthe price policy of 
established big businesses, and its free competitive pricing will be possible 
solely through白e“Capacityto produce high叩1alityintelligence.”ω 
Let the quantity of supply (Q) of the axisof abscissa increase with the 
lapse of time, MR0 be the marginal revenue curve of established big 
businesses and DD curve be the gross demand curve of the market, and 
also let MRs be the marginal revenue curve of the entering venture busi-
ness in to the market. 
As 1s found m most modern textbooks and treallses on economic 
theory，吐10geometry of tangency solution by Robinson and Chamberlin, 
shows a firm producing an output where a falling curve of unit cost 1s
tangent to the flrm's demand curve and a rising marginal cost curve inter-
sects a fallmg margmal revenue curve But there 1s, usually, no specific 
instruction given for construct泊Ethe demand curve of也eimperfect 
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competitor A very great number of as皿mptionsabout吐10behavior 
of each rival is possible. Their real-world behavior always involves a 
certain amount of leammg by doing nature, so, it cannot be completely 
d田cribed目
In廿tissituat10n, if the firm is presumed to have perfect knowledge 
of the demand for the industry’s product, it wil regard the residual 
portion of the industry demand curve as its own. If the firm is pre四med.
not to have血isperfect knowledge, then its own demand curve becomes 
P.C 
Ps 
Po 
Pn 
D 
ds 
LAC 
Q（鼠』ply)
Figure 2 Long四ngemonopolized competitive equilibrium, 
after the entry of information venture business 
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an entrepreneunal guess which needs no stnct re!at10n to the residual 
portion of the industry’s dem叩dcurve. Then, we may say that there 1s 
no such thing as tangency solution in the 加 perfectcompetitive market 
Innumerable possibil1hes exist because each as四mpt10nabout how 
nval firms react to one another’s strategies dictates a different tangency 
solution. Among many points (Q1 to Qβ，Or is an optimal tangency 
solut10n in血e‘textbook’andat血eprimary period of entry of venture 
busmess, fixed cost and variable costs are higher than those of established 
big businesses. Thus, marginal revenue MRs is stil low til Q3 in which 
first mol!ve possibly occur in venture business which 1s absorbed into the 
affiliated big businesses While the excellence of softw町eis being es!-
mated m the market, degrees of angle‘theta’of MRs curve tend upwards 
and attain the turning pomt (S) where venture business gains higher 
profits (MRs) than MR0 of big firms. Some of the small-sized firms 
which were not able to improve their marginal profit until Q2 period, 
leads to bankruptcy or withdraws from market, or else, may be absorbed 
into the big自立ngroups. The mtersection point 'S’of marginal revenue 
curves MR0 and MRs show a“turnmg po担t.＇’ Inline with the condition 
of “absolute secrecy”m the nature of infonnation, if venture business 
cont担uesto deal only泊“Softwareintelligence service" requested by 
few restricted clients, social demands will soon cease to expand目 There-
fore, it ought to shift the former policy mto the new stage where selling 
the “Excluded”infonnation services (goods) is protected by program 
licences, etc. In this stage, the necessary condit10n is corporate-1dentity 
corresponding to the development of high-quality software, and it is a 
highly desirable requisite for infonnation venture business just now, 
because the “Exclusivity”of information mtelligence cannot yet be 
perfectly ensured 
V Consideration 
Some problems of the above hypothesis exist m the logical basis per-
tammg to how to determine a demand curve dd which is confronted by 
venture business Namely, 1s 1t possible to suppose the right-side declin-
mg md!V!dual demand curve a prion? How are we to detennine the in-
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dividual demand curve correlating with the closely related substitution 
goods as“software services，” their pnces, and business behaviors, etc.? 
Its determinant factors have not necessanly been clarified yet. They are 
the environmental factors fluctuating in accordance with conditional 
fluctuat10n of market. Then, they must be observed m the stage of 
individual research cases. 
And if血eexpans10n of needs (a sort of high quality software or in-
formatioのtakesplace and raises external economy，面 curvehas a 
po田ibilityof shifting upwards to DD’(1969). Unlike ordinary consumer 
goods with elasticity of substitution in output, because of the nature of 
“Information”goods, especially with the changmg character of business 
behavior which takes泊toaccount the secrecy in the nature of software 
mtelligence, systematizal!on tendency turns血etide of the industry, and 
we have to deal with this problem within the frame of oligopoly 
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Notes 
(I) Criticism of Schumpeter’s views on capitalism 1s m R.L. Hetlbroner 
(I 981). 
(2) According to the research by Mansfield, where the central-institute 
of big busmess was examined, R & D nsk is not so high and the de-
fic1t is limited withm 25 %. Also, Baumol-Wilhamson Model IS suit 
able for inference. 
(3) About the ‘quality’problems of R & D, see, W. D. Nordhaus (1969). 
(4) This re<earch (1978) was intended to estimate the import叩 ce-level
of 57 human factors (selected through preliminary search process), 
which are supposed to have an influence on researcher’S wil or 
productivity For example, 30 higher rankmg factors are as follows; 
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Influential Factors evaluated by researchers 
I. Researcher’s interest in the Job 
2. Researcher’s ability 
3. Sufficiency of equipment and establishment 
4 Leadership by the superior officer 
5. Researcher’s potential talent 
6. Exhausted atmosphere with regard to energy and resources 
7. Research Circumstance of rival firms 
8 Personality of researchers 
9. Evaluation of research theme in the f凹n
10. The amount of research funds 
11. Sufficiency of physical service for research activity 
12 Understandmg of management about R&D 
13 Interest担 thejob of the supenor officer (of direct control) 
14 Allocation and transfer of researchers 
15. Treatment of researchers 
16. Alteration or discontinuation of research themes 
17 Determination of research themes 
18. Atmosphere of R&D department 
19. Ordinary working behavior of the superior officer 
(of direct control) 
20. Sufficiency of manpower-service for research 
21. Human relation within the research team or in the laboratory 
22. Researchers' good relationship with each other泊 academic
learning and job 
23. Human relation with the superior officer 
24. Ability of the superior officer 
25. Internal posit10n of R&D department 
26 Allowance of discret10nal use about research expenses 
27 Critenon and abtlity-estimat10n of researchers 
28. Sufficiency of information service on research 
29. Personality of the superior officer 
30 Organization of R&D department 
(5) See MIT!：“The Survey of Special Designated Service-Business ” 
(6) Since IBM carried out the Unbundling in Amenca, ADR (Applied 
Data Research), Cincom Systems, Informatics and such software 
firms have developed many original basic softwares (TOT AL, Li-
brarian, etc.), achieved differentiation from Main framers and then 
enjoyed splendid growth. The softwares for “Data-communication” 
are now increasing See, for example, Saito (1983), Kik血 Shinko
Kai (1981). 
(7) The difference may be not so great. 
(8) G. Stigler verified by his demonstrative analysis of pnce leadership, 
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that the increase in the number of firms in one market enhances the 
elasticity of prices [ G. Stigler；“The Kmky Oligopoly Demand 
Curve and Rigid Pnces，”Journal of Political Economy (Oct. 194 7) ) 
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情報産業ベンチャービジネスの
研究開発行動と市場参入
〈要約〉
町田忠治
情報産業は産業構造的知識集約化，高付加価値化の潮流を代表する先
端産業の一角にあって脚光を浴ぴてきたが，広くは新聞，放送，出版，
広告，そして情報処理，シンクタンクなど，情報収集・加工・提供にか
かわる産業の総称である。
これら産業に共通する商品，「財」としての「情報」は，当然，特殊経
済財としての制約を受ける。すなわち，公共財としての性質の他に排他
性，不可逆性，秘匿性，不確実性，不分割性等々の性質にかかわる制約
である。
問題を「インテリジエンス」としての情報に絞るとき，一つの「情報」
の完全な代替財と呼ばれるべき情報は稀少であり，これが独占価値を形
成する素因である。
従って，仮にベンチャービジネスが情報産業の独占的市場に参入し，
橋頭盤を築くことが可能であるときは，既成大企業の未だ開発していな
いオリジナル情報システム・プログラムを開発し，排他的ノウハウとす
るか，日本に於ては未だ脆弱な保護能力に止まっているが，プログラム・
ライセンスを取ってこれを守る以外にはない。
情報産業ベンチャービジネスの発展期に於て危険な時期は創成期では
なく，むしろ限られたクライアントを対象にSoftwareintelligenceサー
ビスを細々と行なっていた時期から，クライアントを拡張してゆく過程
で，プログラム・ライセンスを公表L，「情報の排他性Jを犠牲にして「不
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確実性」に挑戦する時である。
その時，市場はオリジナノレ情報システムの次元（ベース）では，独占下
の制約的供給のステージから不完全競争のステージに移行する。広告や
販売促進手段を持たない情報産業の場合，情報の「排他性」が不完全な
保護下に於て，他と劃するものは，システム・プログラムの独自性であ
り，次いてー汎用性でなければならない。
高度なシステム プログラムがCIと結びっく時が企業を磐石にする
機会である。
